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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
“The Government of the United States has broad, undoubted power over 
the subject of immigration and the status of aliens.” Arizona v. United States, 567 
U.S. 387, 394 (2012). Exercising that power, Congress has forbidden States to 
issue professional licenses to immigrants illegally present in the United States. 
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1621(a), 1621(c)(1)(A). But Congress also lets States opt out of that 
ban—States may allow unlawfully present immigrants to obtain professional 
licenses “through the enactment of a State law after August 22, 1996, which 
affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” Id. § 1621(d).  
Petitioners ask this Court to promulgate a rule making undocumented 
immigrants eligible for admission to the Utah State Bar. This Court, in turn, has 
sought the Utah Attorney General’s Office’s views on whether the Court “may 
‘enact[] . . . a state law’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) permitting membership in the 
Utah State Bar for undocumented immigrants; and if so, whether it would be 
appropriate for the Court to do so.” Order at 2 (Nov. 19, 2018).  
In the Attorney General’s Office’s view, this Court may adopt a rule 
allowing undocumented immigrants to become members of the Utah State Bar. 
In fact, because this Court has interpreted the Utah Constitution to give it the 
exclusive power to regulate Utah State Bar admissions, only this Court has 
power under Utah law to enact a lawyer-specific opt-out provision that satisfies 
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section 1621(d). Any attempt by the Utah Legislature to regulate bar admissions 
for immigrants—of any legal status—would be invalid as a matter of State law.  
Even so, the Court should strongly consider not promulgating an opt-out 
rule. At least, it should strongly consider not doing so yet. Immigration questions 
raise policy-laden disputes of great political import to many State constituencies. 
As the Court itself has acknowledged, resolving such inherently political policy 
disputes is not its forte. So to best ensure that this Court—a politically 
unaccountable body—sets state policy in a way that accounts for the myriad 
competing policy considerations, in these unique circumstances the Court should 
follow the Legislature’s lead. It should strongly consider waiting to promulgate 
an opt-out rule for aspiring lawyers until the Legislature has first passed opt-out 
legislation authorizing undocumented immigrants to obtain the types of 
professional licenses that are within the Legislature’s power to regulate. 
ARGUMENT 
I.  This Court’s Bar-Admission Rules Constitute “Enactment[s] of . . . State 
Law” for Purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d). 
 No one appears to seriously dispute that States satisfy section 1621(d)’s 
opt-out requirement when their legislatures pass a statute “affirmatively 
provid[ing]” that undocumented immigrants may obtain professional licenses. 8 
U.S.C. § 1621(d). But that does not answer the question whether the phrase 
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“enactment of a State law” in section 1621(d) unambiguously makes legislation 
the only way States can opt out.  
In the Attorney General’s Office’s view, it does not. That text can—and 
especially in this context, should—be interpreted to allow Utah to opt out by a 
court rule making undocumented immigrants eligible for bar admission. 
A. Section 1621(d)’s phrase “enactment of a State law” does not 
unambiguously mean only a statute passed by a legislature. 
 Statutory construction begins, “as always, with the statutory text.” LeBeau 
v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 26, 337 P.3d 254.  
On its face, the word “law” in section 1621(d) is not limited to statutes. The 
word “law” bears a broad definition. One dictionary contemporaneous with 
section 1621(d)’s passage lists 17 definitions for the word “law.” The New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1544-45 (5th ed. 1993). An earlier one lists nine 
definitions, each containing from one to five subparts. Webster’s Third New Int’l 
Dictionary 1279 (1963). And the definition of “law” in the edition of Black’s Law 
Dictionary contemporaneous with section 1621(d) spans two pages. Black’s Law 
Dictionary 884-85 (6th ed. 1990).  
A few examples show this term’s sweeping scope. Law is defined as a 
“rule of conduct imposed by secular authority”—specifically, the “body of rules, 
whether formally enacted or customary, which a particular State or community 
recognizes as governing the actions of its subjects or members and which it may 
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enforce by imposing penalties.” New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 1544 
(first entry). It is also defined as “a binding custom or practice of a community: a 
rule or mode of conduct or action that is prescribed or formally recognized as 
binding by a supreme controlling authority or is made obligatory by a sanction 
(as an edict, decree, rescript, order, ordinance, statute, resolution, rule, judicial 
decision, or usage).” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary at 1279 (first entry). 
But it can also mean “[a]ny of the body of individual rules in force in a State or 
community”; the “action of the courts, as a means of providing redress of 
grievances or enforcing claims”; or “[t]he statute and common law.” New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 1544 (second, fifth, and sixth entries).  
Alternatively, law is defined as “[t]hat which is laid down, ordained, or 
established. . . . Law, in its generic sense, is a body of rules of action or conduct 
prescribed by controlling authority, and having binding legal force.” Black’s Law 
Dictionary at 884 (6th ed.). Black’s continues: “The ‘law’ of a state is to be found 
in its statutory and constitutional enactments, as interpreted by its courts, and, in 
absence of statute law, in rulings of its courts.” Id. But the “word may mean or 
embrace: body of principles, standards and rules promulgated by government”; 
“administrative agency rules and regulations”; or “judicial decisions, judgments 
or decrees.” Id. (citations omitted). Thus “law” plainly comprises statutes, but it 
just as plainly is not limited to them. 
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The contextual clues from the rest of section 1621(d)’s text do not 
undermine that conclusion. See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ¶ 12, 248 
P.3d 465. On the contrary, they buttress it. Congress used the compound noun 
“State law” in section 1621(d). And “[a]t least since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938),” the Supreme Court has “recognized the phrase ‘state law’ to 
include common law as well as statutes and regulations.” Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 522 (1992) (plurality op.). “[I]t is a cardinal rule of 
statutory construction that, when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably 
knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word 
in the body of learning from which it is taken.” Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp. v. 
Hoeper, 571 U.S. 237, 248 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because in 
1996 it had been settled U.S. Supreme Court precedent for nearly 60 years that 
the phrase “State law” included a state’s common law, statutes, and regulations, 
this Court can presume that Congress borrowed that broader meaning when it 
used that compound noun in section 1621(d). 
Neither does the term “enactment” in section 1621(d) rebut that 
presumption and require reading “State law” to mean only “statute.” Enactment 
is defined as “[t]he action of enacting a law; the state or fact of being enacted.” 
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary at 812. It can also mean “[a] thing which 
is enacted; an ordinance, a statute,” or “[t]he provisions of a law.” Id.  
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That definition admittedly encompasses both the act of a legislature’s 
passing a statute and the statute thus produced. See also Black’s Law Dictionary 
at 526 (6th ed.) (defining “Enactment” as “[t]he method or process by which a bill 
in the Legislature becomes a law”). But other contemporaneous usages suggest 
that “enactment” can also mean lawmaking processes other than a legislature’s 
passing a statute—particularly rulemaking processes. 
 Most relevant, before Congress passed section 1621(d), the United States 
Supreme Court repeatedly used the words “enactment” or “enact” to describe 
regulatory processes—not legislation—producing non-statutory laws. For 
example, the Court pointed to its prior holding that a state bureau of prisons had 
created a protected liberty interest for certain prison inmates “by enacting 
regulations that ‘used language of an unmistakably mandatory character.’” 
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221 (1990) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 
460, 471 (1983)). It cited “real-world experience” as the reason “the Postal Service 
enacted the regulation at issue” in United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 735 
(1990). Justice White once described how the Minnesota commissioner of 
corrections “enacted new parole regulations” governing prisoners’ release dates. 
Bailey v. Noot, 503 U.S. 952, 952 (1992) (White, J., dissenting from the denial of 
certiorari). And in deciding what level of deference to apply to agency action, the 
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Court observed that “an agency” may be “empowered to enact legislative rules.” 
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 517 n.13 (1981). 
Utah courts use that word the same way. This Court described its 
authority under article VIII, section 4 of the Utah Constitution as the “authority 
to enact rules of evidence and procedure.” Brown v. Cox, 2017 UT 3, ¶ 17, 387 
P.3d 1040. The court of appeals said the Department of Professional Licensing 
“enacted the Rule” an appellant had challenged as exceeding DOPL’s authority. 
Zen Healing Arts LLC v. Dep’t of Commerce, 2018 UT App 25, ¶ 4, 417 P.3d 629. 
And this Court has resolved cases by relying on Black’s Law Dictionary’s 
definition of “[p]ositive law” as law that “‘typically consists of enacted law—the 
codes, statutes, and regulations that are applied and enforced in the courts.’” 
Proulx v. Salt Lake City Recorder, 2013 UT 2, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 573 (quoting Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1280 (9th ed. 2009)). Other examples abound.1 
                                                          
1 See, e.g., Ross v. Schackel, 920 P.2d 1159, 1170 (Utah 1996) (Stewart, A.C.J., 
dissenting) (noting “a sheep inspector, as a public officer, was statutorily 
authorized to enact regulations and take specific actions to protect the public 
health”); Cruz v. Middlekauff Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1260 n.2 (Utah 
1996) (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in the result) (noting that the United States 
Department of Transportation “has enacted a regulation requiring” car 
manufacturers to install a certain safety feature); Elks Lodge No. 719 (Ogden) & No. 
2021 (Moab) v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 905 P.2d 1189, 1206 (Utah 1995) 
(describing the holding of a California case “involving an apartment complex 
that enacted a rule prohibiting families with children from leasing apartments”).  
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In short, “the enactment of a State law” that Congress requires of States as 
a precondition to their issuing professional licenses to unlawfully present 
immigrants is best read to include not just a statute but also a rule or regulation 
that “affirmatively provides for such eligibility.” 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).  
B. Interpreting section 1621(d) to allow opting out only by legislation 
would raise grave constitutional questions. 
 At a minimum, section 1621(d) is ambiguous about whether States can opt 
out in ways other than by passing statutes. So the Court can employ additional 
tools of statutory construction to discern its meaning. See LeBeau, 2014 UT 39, 
¶ 26. In these unique circumstances, the most relevant of those tools is the canon 
of constitutional avoidance, which supports interpreting section 1621(d) to allow 
Utah to opt out by court rule. 
The canon of constitutional avoidance says that courts may “reject[] one of 
two plausible constructions of a statute on the ground that it would raise grave 
doubts as to its constitutionality.” Utah Dep’t of Transp. v. Carlson, 2014 UT 24, 
¶ 23, 332 P.3d 900. This canon “shows proper respect for the legislature, which is 
assumed to ‘legislate[] in the light of constitutional limitations.’” Id. (quoting Rust 
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991)).  
Reading section 1621(d) to prescribe legislation as the only way Utah can 
authorize bar admissions for undocumented immigrants would raise serious 
anticommandeering concerns. The anticommandeering doctrine “represents the 
9 
 
recognition” that Congress lacks “power to issue direct orders to the 
governments of the States.” Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1461, 1476 (2018). Congress cannot do so because the States “retained ‘a 
residuary and inviolable sovereignty’” when they entered the Union. Id. at 1475 
(quoting Federalist No. 39). That inherent sovereignty includes “a State’s 
constitutional responsibility for the establishment and operation of its own 
government.” Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973). Indeed, “[t]hrough 
the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise 
government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); see also City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 
U.S. 668, 672 (1976) (“Under our constitutional assumptions, all power derives 
from the people, who can delegate it to representative instruments which they 
create.”). This Court has recognized this same “basic premise, upon which all our 
government is built”—“the people have the inherent authority to allocate 
governmental power in the bodies they establish by law.” Carter v. Lehi City, 2012 
UT 2, ¶ 21, 269 P.3d 141. 
Interpreting section 1621(d)’s opt-out provision to require an exercise of 
state sovereign power by one specific branch of state government—the 
legislature—raises grave anticommandeering concerns. To be sure, this 
manifestation of anticommandeering differs from those held unconstitutional in 
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Murphy, New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898 (1997). In those cases, Congress issued express federal commands 
requiring state officials to do something. Here, Congress admittedly does not 
require state officials (in any governmental branch) to do anything; section 
1621(d) lets States chose to opt out or not, as they wish.  
But if section 1621(d) is interpreted to make only statutory opt-outs 
effective, it becomes a federal command that a State assign specific sovereign 
powers to a particular branch of state government. Specifically, reading section 
1621(d) that way would make a State’s exercise of its sovereign power over 
professional licenses (including bar admissions) invalid unless its legislature 
exercised it. It’s hard to think of a more direct federal intrusion on the States’ core 
retained sovereign rights recognized in Sugarman, Gregory, City of Eastlake, and 
Carter to structure their governments—and assign their sovereign powers—as 
they see fit. 
And that’s not just a theoretical anticommandeering problem. The people 
of Utah have in fact assigned their sovereign power over bar admissions to this 
Court. The Utah Constitution gives “[t]he Supreme Court” the power to “govern 
the practice of law, including admission to practice law,” “by rule.” Utah Const. 
art. VIII, § 4. This Court has interpreted that provision to give the Court 
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“plenary” and “exclusive authority to govern the practice of law.” Injured 
Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, ¶¶ 14, 43, 374 P.3d 14.  
The upshot? As a matter of state law, any attempt by the Utah Legislature 
to satisfy section 1621(d) by passing an opt-out statute for bar admissions would 
be a nullity. So reading section 1621(d) to limit a state’s ability to opt out only by 
passing a statute constitutes an actual, concrete affront to Utah’s sovereignty—a 
congressional conclusion that Utah has misallocated its sovereign powers. That’s 
at least as constitutionally offensive as Congress’s “issu[ing] direct orders to state 
legislatures” that those legislatures theoretically could carry out. Murphy, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1478. It might be even more problematic—it’s Congress requiring a state 
legislature to exercise a state power that the State has by sovereign right 
determined should be vested in another part of its government. 
Given section 1621(d)’s ambiguity, this Court should rely on the canon of 
constitutional avoidance to conclude that the Court may satisfy section 1621(d)’s 
opt-out provision by enacting the proposed rule.2 
                                                          
2 Some amici have argued that bar admissions in Utah are not subject to section 
1621(a)’s ban because, they contend, in Utah a bar license is neither provided by 
a state agency nor funded by appropriated state funds. See, e.g., Br. of Amicus 
Curiae Parr Brown Gee & Loveless, P.C. at 3-7 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A)); Br. 
of Amici Curiae Ad Hoc Coalition of Utah Law Professors at 7-15 (same). 
Nationally, courts are reassessing whether compelled membership in, or funding 
of, private entities such as bar associations is consonant with the First 
Amendment. See, e.g., Fleck v. Wetch, 139 S. Ct. 590 (2018) (granting certiorari, 
vacating the judgment in 868 F.3d 652, and remanding the case to the Eighth 
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II.  Because the Petition Is Inextricably Linked to a Deeply Political Issue, 
the Court Should Strongly Consider Not Enacting an Opt-Out Rule for 
Bar Admissions Until the Legislature Passes Opt-Out Legislation for 
Other Professional Licenses. 
Though this Court can enact an opt-out rule that would satisfy section 
1621(d), the more appropriate course in these unique circumstances would be to 
follow the Legislature’s policy lead. The Court should strongly consider 
adopting an opt-out rule for bar admissions only after the Legislature has passed 
a statute allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain other professional 
licenses. That conclusion follows from three straightforward premises. 
First, when it enacts rules for bar admission, this Court makes policy. Bar-
admission rules are “rules of general applicability” for aspiring lawyers and 
involve “the ‘weighing of broad, competing policy considerations’”—the two 
“chief hallmarks of legislative action.” Krejci v. City of Saratoga Springs, 2013 UT 
74, ¶ 31, 322 P.3d 662. To be sure, the constitution assigns this limited 
policymaking function to the Court. But in that role the Court deviates sharply 
                                                          
Circuit for it to consider—in light of Janus v. State, Cty., & Municipal Employees, 
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)—the petitioner’s arguments that mandatory membership in 
a state bar association, and state bar’s opt-out funding rule, violate the First 
Amendment). To avoid inadvertently implicating those separate constitutional 
questions, this Court may wish to assume without deciding that Utah bar 
licenses are subject to section 1621(a)’s ban—particularly since the Attorney 
General’s Office’s analysis and amici’s approach reach the same conclusion on the 
Court’s first question. 
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from its usual role of “interpreting the policy decisions of the legislature—not on 
making [policy] decisions in the first place.” Carter, 2012 UT 2, ¶ 50. 
Second, as the Court itself has long acknowledged, the Court is not well 
equipped to tackle divisive policy questions. “‘As a general rule, making social 
policy is a job for the Legislature, not the courts.’” Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, 
¶ 34, 154 P.3d 808 (quoting Van v. Zahorik, 597 N.W.2d 15, 18 (Mich. 1999)). 
Indeed, the Court has been “‘especially’” reluctant to make policy “‘when the 
determination or resolution requires placing a premium on one societal interest 
at the expense of another.’” Id. (quoting Van, 597 N.W.2d at 18). “Courts are ill-
suited for such ventures” because they “are unable to fully investigate the 
ramifications of social policies and cannot gauge or build the public consensus 
necessary to effectively implement them.” Id. ¶ 36. The Court thus protects its 
institutional credibility and legitimacy through actions recognizing that “‘[t]he 
responsibility for drawing lines in a society as complex as ours—of identifying 
priorities, weighing the relevant considerations and choosing between 
competing alternatives—is the Legislature’s, not the judiciary’s.’” Id. ¶ 34 
(quoting Van, 597 N.W.2d at 18). 
 Third, this particular policy issue—immigration—is a uniquely hot-button 
political topic. The constant drumbeat of immigration-related news stories 
14 
 
reflects how squarely this issue remains fixed in our national conversation.3 Even 
more to the point, immigration policy remain unsettled in Utah. Just last week, 
the Salt Lake Tribune reported on local efforts “to reaffirm” immigration policies 
that, in their proponents’ view, “emphasiz[ed] humane treatment of immigrants, 
keeping families together and focusing deportation on serious criminals.” Lee 
Davidson, Officials reaffirm family-friendly Utah Compact on immigration. LDS 
Church still backs it but again doesn’t sign it., Salt Lake Trib. (Mar. 21, 2019), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2019/03/21/officials-reaffirm-family/. 
One participant said that “‘our immigration system is still in need of significant 
reform.’” Id. The proponents reemphasized their principles to push those reforms 
their way because “[i]mmigration debates remain bitter.” Id. 
And that’s precisely the point. The policy debates about immigration differ 
in kind from policy debates about, say, what the bar examination should consist 
of, see Rule 14-710, or who should be admitted to the Utah State Bar by motion, 
see Rule 14-705. Those latter issues command significantly less cognizance. So the 
                                                          
3 See, e.g., Nick Miroff, ‘The Conveyor Belt’: U.S. officials say massive smuggling effort 
is speeding immigrants to—and across—the southern border,  
Wash. Post (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-
conveyor-belt-us-officials-say-massive-smuggling-effort-is-speeding-immigrants-
to--and-across--the-southern-border/2019/03/15/940bf860-4022-11e9-a0d3-
1210e58a94cf_story.html; Julia Ainsley, February had highest total of undocumented 




Court’s policy experience or expertise on those questions does not necessarily 
transfer to immigration policy debates that remain unresolved despite more than 
a decade of effort from Utah’s political branches. 
To highlight this ongoing national and local debate is not to take a side in 
it. Rather, it is to reiterate what the U.S. Supreme Court has already said: 
“Immigration policy shapes the destiny of the Nation.” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 415. 
And “the sound exercise of national power over immigration depends on the 
Nation’s meeting its responsibility to base its laws on a political will informed by 
searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse.” Id. at 416.  
But if this Court unilaterally opts out of section 1621(d) now by enacting a 
rule authorizing bar admission for undocumented immigrants, the Court will be 
taking an unavoidably political stance on a hot-button policy question before the 
Legislature has manifested the state’s “political will” on it. Id. The Court could 
do so, but that would disregard the wisdom behind the Court’s prior 
acknowledgement that this body is ill suited to “draw[] lines in a society as 
complex as ours.” Jones, 2007 UT 20, ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
proposed rule necessarily “plac[es] a premium on one societal interest at the 
expense of another,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted)—despite this Court’s 
being “unable to fully investigate the ramifications of [this] social polic[y]” or 
16 
 
“gauge or build the public consensus necessary to effectively implement” it, id. 
¶ 36.   
The Attorney General’s Office emphasizes that it takes no position on 
whether the proposed rule is a good or bad idea. It does not do so because the 
Legislature—not this Office—is best suited to declare the State’s “political will,” 
after a “searching, thoughtful, rational civic discourse,” Arizona, 567 U.S. at 416, 
about whether undocumented immigrants should be eligible for professional 
licenses in Utah. In other words, this Office and this Court share the same 
institutional and structural deficiencies for resolving these types of inherently 
political questions “upon which there is no broad consensus.” Jones, 2007 UT 20, 
¶ 38. Institutional modesty thus counsels in favor of deference to the Legislature 
on this important question.4 
                                                          
4 To the best of the Office’s knowledge, the part of the Utah Code most relevant 
to this question is section 63G-12-402. That section requires state agencies to 
“verify the lawful presence” of an applicant for “a state or local public benefit as 
defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1621.” Utah Code § 63G-12-402(1)(a)(i). Among the few 
exceptions to that rule, see id. § 63G-12-402(3), only subsection 402(3)(g) appears 
to speak to a professional license—specifically, a securities license—and even 
then the exception applies only to applicants who have “registered with the 
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,” id. § 63G-12-402(3)(g)(i). So as a whole, 
subsection 402(3)’s exceptions do not appear to constitute the sort of 
“affirmative[]” general legislative endorsement of professional licenses for 
undocumented immigrants, 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), that might make enacting a bar-
admissions rule appropriate now. Cf. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 4-111(3)(b), 4-111(3)(e) 
(expressly invoking “the authority provided in 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d)” to prescribe 





 This Court may enact a rule that satisfies 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d) and allows 
undocumented immigrants to become members of the Utah State Bar. But given 
undisputed political realities, it should strongly consider not doing so until the 
Legislature has first passed a statute making undocumented immigrants 
generally eligible to obtain the types of professional licenses that are within the 
Legislature’s power to regulate. 
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